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Prescribed-Time Fully Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking in Noncooperative Games
Zhi Feng and Guoqiang Hu
Abstract—In this paper, we investigate a prescribed-time and fully
distributed Nash Equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for continuous-
time noncooperative games. By exploiting pseudo-gradient play and
consensus-based schemes, various distributed NE seeking algorithms
are presented over either fixed or switching communication topolo-
gies so that the convergence to the NE is reached in a prescribed time.
In particular, a prescribed-time distributed NE seeking algorithm is
firstly developed under a fixed graph to find the NE in a prior-given
and user-defined time, provided that a static controller gain can be
selected based on certain global information such as the algebraic
connectivity of the communication graph and both the Lipschitz and
monotone constants of the pseudo-gradient associated with players’
objective functions. Secondly, a prescribed-time and fully distributed
NE seeking algorithm is proposed to remove global information by
designing heterogeneous dynamic gains that turn on-line the weights
of the communication topology. Further, we extend this algorithm to
accommodate jointly switching topologies. It is theoretically proved
that the global convergence of those proposed algorithms to the NE is
rigorously guaranteed in a prescribed time based on a time function
transformation approach. In the last, numerical simulation results
are presented to verify the effectiveness of the designs.
The advantages of the proposed NE seeking algorithm include: 1)
the convergence time is user-defined according to task requirements,
which is neither dependent on any initial states or the parameters of
the algorithm; 2) the proposed algorithm is fully distributed without
requiring any global information on the graph’s algebraic connectiv-
ity, the pseudo-gradient’s Lipschitz and monotone constants, and the
number of players; and 3) the communication graph is allowed to be
jointly switching. The aforementioned requirements can improve the
practical relevance of the problem to be addressed and meanwhile, it
poses some technical challenges to the algorithm design and stability
analysis, which makes that the NE seeking algorithms in the existing
literature cannot be directly applied.
Index Terms—Noncooperative game, NE seeking algorithm, Fully
distributed, Prescribed-time convergence, Switching topologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking of non-cooperative
games has become a hot research topic during the past decade due
to its broad applications in multi-robot systems [1], mobile sensor
networks [3], smart grids [5], and so on. In contrast to early works
(e.g., [2], [4], [6]) with a complete information setting, players in
distributed NE seeking have limited local information, i.e., each
player needs to make the decision based on the local or relative
information, e.g., information from its neighbors, to optimize its
own cost function. The main challenges of distributed NE seeking
exist in twofold: 1) each player’s objective function is dependent
on the other players’ actions and therefore, its strategy is directly
influenced by other players; and 2) each player is required to not
only update its own strategy, but also to communicate on networks
to estimate other players’ actions.
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Related literature: gradient-based NE seeking algorithms with
average consensus or leader-follower consensus designs are popu-
lar techniques to find the NE of networked games. Distributed NE
seeking issues of continuous-time games have been addressed in
[8]–[16]. In particular, distributed algorithms are proposed in [8]
and [9] by combining the leader-follower consensus designs and
gradient-play strategies over an undirected and connected graph.
The singular perturbation method is employed to ensure that the
consensus design can be faster than the gradient updating part,
and the semi-global asymptotic convergence is thus achieved. The
authors in [10] exploit some incremental passivity properties of
pseudo-gradients to illustrate that the estimates of the proposed
augmented gradient dynamics converge to the NE exponentially
under graph coupling conditions. The singular perturbation design
is further developed to provide an adjustable singular perturbation
parameter so as to relax graph conditions. Distributed NE seeking
of aggregative games is investigated in [11] and [12], where the
former presents a nonsmooth NE seeking algorithm with identical
constant gains, while the latter designs the controller based on a
singular perturbation parameter. An alternating direction method
of multipliers’ design with the constant step-size is given in [13].
Recently, [14] uses a gradient-free NE seeking scheme for limited
cost knowledge, where an almost sure NE convergence is obtained
by a diminishing step-size, while a uniformly ultimately bounded
(UUB) convergence is achieved by a fixed step-size.
Research gap: to the best of knowledge, there are some design
limitations that have not been dealt with in the aforementioned
works in [8]–[16]. Firstly, one observation is that those aforemen-
tioned NE seeking results can guarantee a semi-global asymptotic
convergence in [8], [9], an asymptotic or exponential convergence
in [10]–[12], a linear convergence in [13], or a UUB convergence
in [14]. That is, the NE is only seek over an infinite-time horizon.
Besides, the convergence rate heavily relies on the players’ initial
conditions, the communication topology structure, and the control
parameter of algorithms, which makes it hard to off-line preassign
convergence time. Hence, it is desirable to propose a prescribed-
time distributed NE seeking algorithm with the convergence time
prior-given and user-defined according to game requirements.
Secondly, another observation is that all works in [8]–[16] require
the static control gains depending on global information such as
the algebraic connectivity of graphs, the Lipschitz and monotone
constants of pseudo-gradients, and the number of players. Notice
that in practice, it is often hard to verify those global information
in a larger-scale multi-agent system. In addition, the used singular
perturbation control gain in [8]–[10] has to be high-enough, which
might be difficult to estimate and implement. Moreover, the non-
smooth algorithm in [11] based on a signum function often brings
undesirable chattering behaviors.Hence, it is desirable to develop
a fully distributed NE seeking algorithm without requiring any
global information, which is smooth with heterogeneous control
gains that can turn on-line the control effort.
2This paper focuses on the prescribed-time and fully distributed
research of NE seeking in noncooperative games, considering that
very few of the existing literature has investigated these properties
in distributed Nash games. The study of the NE convergence rate
is partially inspired by the recent finite-/fixed-time research in the
distributed consensus and optimization (e.g., [17]–[26]), which
suffers from certain design limitations that make them not suitable
for prescribed-time distributed NE games (comparison details are
summarized in Remark 6, and omitted here).
In this paper, we provide some feasible and easy-implemented
algorithms to accomplish the task of distributed NE seeking with
the arbitrary convergence time guarantee. The main technique is
to exploit a time transformation function method, under which we
transform the proposed smooth prescribed-time algorithm into an
infinite-time interval. Then, the Laypunov stability theory is still
allowed to analyze the convergence of the NE in this infinite-time
interval. As compared to existing distributed NE seeking works,
the main contributions of this work can be summarized:
• To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first work to
present a smooth and prescribed-time distributed NE seeking
architecture to solve this issue. Different from the existing
distributed NE results in [8]–[16], the salient feature of the
proposed algorithm is that the arbitrary convergence time for
reaching the consensus of all players’ estimates and seeking
the NE globally, is independent of any initial conditions and
design parameters, thus can be explicitly pre-specified. This
fast convergence is of great significance for a wide range of
NE game applications in large-scale systems.
• Moreover, a prescribed-time and fully distributed NE seeking
algorithm is developed, where the design not only provides a
fast convergence but also not rely on any global information
like the graph’s algebraic connectivity, the pseudo-gradient’s
Lipschitz and monotone constants, and the number of players
as required in [8]–[16]. The global fast convergence to the
NE is achieved through adaptively adjusting a dynamic gain
on the edges of the communication graph. In the absence of
prescribed-time requirements, the works in [15] and [16] also
aim to solve distributed NE seeking issues via the dynamic
gain. Unfortunately, the former adopting a decaying control
gain requires global information, and the latter comes at the
cost of two-hop communication among players.
• Based on the time transformation method and the LaSalle’s
invariance principle, it is shown that the proposed prescribed-
time and fully distributed architecture guarantees that the NE
is globally stable by mild and standard assumptions on the
players’ pseudo-gradients and communication graphs. Lastly,
the extension is presented to accommodate jointly switching
topologies. In addition, the proposed algorithms are suitable
for a general Nash game where the cost functions are coupled
with other agents, which can cover the potential game in [5]
and aggregative games in [11]–[13].
The paper is organized as follows. Section II gave mathematical
preliminaries. The non-cooperative game and the main objective
are presented in Section III. Some prescribed-time distributed
algorithms are proposed in Section IV with convergence analysis.
Examples and numerical simulation results are given in Section
V, followed by the conclusion in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
Denote R, Rn, and Rn×m as the sets of the real numbers,
real n-dimensional vectors and real n×m matrices, respectively.
Let 0n (1n) be the n× 1 vector with all zeros (ones) and In be
the identity matrix. Let col(x1, ..., xn) and diag{a1, ..., an} be a
column vector with entries xi and a diagonal matrix with entries
ai, i = 1, · · · , n, respectively. The symbols ⊗ and ‖·‖ represent
the Kronecker product and the Euclidean norm, respectively.
Given a real symmetric matrixM , letM > 0 (M ≥ 0) denote that
M is positive (or positive semi-definite), and λmin(M), λmax(M)
are its minimum and maximum eigenvalues, respectively.
B. Convex analysis
A function f : Rn → R is convex if f(ax+(1−a)y) ≤ af(x)+
(1− a)f(y) for any scalar a ∈ [0, 1] and vectors x, y ∈ Rn. f is
locally Lipschitz on Rn if it is locally Lipschitz at x for ∀x ∈ Rn.
If f is a differentiable function, ▽f denotes the gradient of f . A
vector-valued function (or mapping) F : Rn → Rn is said to be
ιF -Lipschitz continuous if, for any x, y ∈ Rn, ‖F (x)−F (y)‖ ≤
ιF ‖x− y‖. Function F : Rn → Rn is (strictly) monotone if, for
any x, y ∈ Rn, (x − y)T (F (x) − F (y))(>) ≥ 0. Further, F is
a ε-strongly monotone, if for any scalar ε > 0, and x, y ∈ Rn,
(x− y)T (F (x)−F (y)) > ε‖x− y‖2. For a function f , it is said
to be Cm if it is mth continuously differentiable.
C. Graph Theory
Fixed graph: let G = {V , E} represent a communication graph,
where V ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} is a set of nodes and E ⊆ V × V is a set
of edges. In this paper, we assume that there is no self loops in
the graph, that is, (i, i) /∈ E . A path from node i1 to node iq is a
sequence of ordered edges in the form of (i1, i2), · · · , (iq−1, iq).
A graph is said to be connected if there exists a path connecting
each pair of distinct nodes. An edge (i, j) ∈ E denotes that ith
agent receives the information from jth agent, but not vice versa.
Graph G is said to be undirected if for any (i, j) ∈ E , (j, i) ∈ E .
Let Ni(G) = {j ∈ V |(j, i) ∈ E} denote the neighborhood set of
node i. The adjacency matrix of G is denoted as A = [aij ] ∈
R
N×N , where aij > 0 if and only if (j, i) ∈ E , else aij = 0. The
Laplacian matrix of G is denoted by L = [lij ] ∈ RN×N , where
lii =
∑N
j=1 aij and lij = −aij if i 6= j. Also, L = D −A with
a matrix D = diag{
∑N
j=1 aij} ∈ R
N×N .
Switching graph: let Gσ(t) =
{
V , Eσ(t)
}
be a switching graph,
where Eσ(t) ⊆ V × V for all t ≥ 0. Here, we call a time function
σ(t) : [0,∞)→ P = {1, · · · ,m} a piecewise constant switching
signal if there exists a time sequence t0 = 0 < t1 < t2 < · · ·
with tk+1 − tk ≥ τ > 0 for certain dwell time τ and k ≥ 0 so
that during [tk, tk+1), σ(t) = i for some i ∈ P and this graph
Gi is time-invariant. For convenience of analysis, Lσ(t) represents
the Laplacian matrix of the undirected graph Gσ(t).
Assumption 1: The fixed undirected graph G is connected.
Assumption 2: For the graph Gσ(t), there exists a subsequence
{lk} of {l : l = 0, 1, · · · } with tlk+1 − tlk < ν for some ν > 0
so that the union graph ∪
lk+1−1
j=lk
Gσ(tj) is connected.
Remark 1: Assumption 1 is standard in distributed NE seek-
ing, while Assumption 2 is called jointly connected (e.g., see [27]
and [28]). The assumption 2 allows the communication topology
to be disconnected at any time instant.
3III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Non-cooperative Game over Networks
In this paper, we consider a multi-agent network consisting of
N players, which form a N-player non-cooperative game defined
as follows. For each agent i ∈ V , the ith player aims to minimize
its cost function Ji(xi, x−i) : Rni → R by choosing its strategy
xi ∈ Rni , and x−i = col(x1, · · · , xi−1, · · · , xN ) is the strategy
profile of the whole strategy profile except for player i. Let x =
(xi, x−i) represent all players’ action profile. Alternatively, let x
= col(x1, · · · , xN ) ∈ Rn, n =
∑
i∈V ni.
Definition 1: (Nash equilibrium) A strategy profile x∗ = (x∗i ,
x∗−i) ∈ R
n is said to be an Nash equilibrium of the game if
Ji(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≤ Ji(xi, x
∗
−i), for ∀xi ∈ R
ni , i ∈ V . (1)
Condition (1) means that all players simultaneously take their
own best (feasible) responses at the NE x∗, where no player can
unilaterally decrease its cost by changing its strategy.
Assumption 3: For each player i, Ji(xi, x−i) is C2, strictly
convex, and radially unbounded in xi for each x−i.
Under Assumption 3, it follows from [29] that an NE x∗ exists,
and satisfies ▽iJi(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) = 0ni , and ▽iJi(xi, x−i) = ∂Ji(xi,
x−i)/∂xi ∈ Rni represents the partial gradient of player i’s cost
with respect to its own action xi. We define
F (x) , col(▽1J1(x1, x−1), · · · ,▽NJN (xN , x−N )), (2)
where F (x) ∈ Rn denotes the pseudo-gradient (the stacked vector
of all players’ partial gradient). Thus, we have F (x∗) = 0n.
Assumption 4: The pesudogradient F is ε-strongly monotone
and ιF -Lipschitz continuous for certain constants ε, ιF > 0.
Remark 2: Assumptions 3 and 4 were widely used in existing
works (e.g., [10]–[15]) to guarantee the unique NE x∗.
B. Main Objective
This work aims to address a prescribed-time and fully dis-
tributed NE seeking problem of noncooperative games as follows.
Problem 1: (Distributed NE Seeking in Prescribed-Time)
Consider a non-cooperative game consisting of N players com-
municating over a communication network. Design a NE seeking
algorithm such that all players can exactly reach the NE x∗ with
prescribed-time and fully distributed convergence features.
minimize Ji(xi(t), x−i(t)), xi(t) ∈ Rni , i ∈ V ,
subject to: x˙i(t) = ui(t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ), T > 0.
(3)
Remark 3: In contrast to existing works in [8]–[16], solving
Problem 1 is much more challenging at least from the following
aspects: (1) Prescribed-time convergence: different from NE seek-
ing results that guarantee a semi-global exponential convergence
in [8], [9], asymptotic or exponential convergence in [10]–[12],
linear convergence in [13], and UUB convergence in [14], it is de-
sirable to solve Problem 1 in the prescribed time (priori-given and
user-defined) that is independent of any initial states, communica-
tion graphs, and control gains. (2) Player communication network:
the topology is jointly switching rather than the static graphs in
[8]–[16]. (3) Design requirement: propose a prescribed-time fully
distributed NE seeking algorithm that does not require any global
graph information and the Lipschitz and monotone constants of
the pseudo-gradient. Due to aforementioned challenges, existing
NE seeking algorithms cannot be directly applied.
IV. PRESCRIBED-TIME DISTRIBUTED NE SEEKING
In distributed NE seeking games, each player i has no access
to the full information of all players’ strategies. Then, each agent
i shall estimate all other players’ strategies. Inspired by [10], let
each player combine its gradient-play dynamics with an auxiliary
dynamics, i.e., implement the following dynamics:{
x˙ii(t) = u
i
i(t), u
i
i(t) = −▽iJi(x
i
i(t), x
i
−i(t)) + e
i
i(t),
x˙ij(t) = u
i
j(t), u
i
j(t) = e
i
j(t), ∀ i, j ∈ V , j 6= i,
(4)
where player i maintains an estimate vector xi = col(xi1, · · · , x
i
i,
· · · , xiN ) in which x
i
j is player i’s estimate of player j’s action,
xii = xi is the player i’s actual action, x
i
−i is the player i’ estimate
vector without its own action, uii = ui is the player i’s actual
input, uij is the other players’ input, and e
i
i, e
i
j are to be developed.
In (4), each player i updates xii to reduce its own cost function and
updates xij to reach consensus with the other players. In addition,
each player i relies on its local estimated action xi−i.
For each player i, (4) can be rewritten in a compact form
x˙
i(t) = ui(t), ui(t) = −RTi ▽iJi(x
i(t)) + ei(t), i ∈ V , (5)
where ui is the control input, ei = col(ei1, · · · , e
i
i, · · · , e
i
N) ∈ R
n
is a relative estimated error to be designed, and Ri ∈ Rni×n used
to align the gradient to action components, is a matrix given by
Ri =
[
0ni×n1 · · · 0ni×ni−1 Ini×ni 0ni×ni+1 · · · 0ni×nN
]
. (6)
A. Prescribed-Time Distributed NE Seeking Design
Before presenting the algorithm, the following lemma on a time
transformation function is introduced to facilitate the design.
Lemma 1: [30] Consider a dynamical system that is described
by x˙(t) = f(t, x(t)) with x(0) = x0. Let ξ(t) denote the solution
to this system and T > 0 is the prior-given and user-defined time.
Then, there exists a time transformation function t = λ(s), s ∈
[0,∞) with λ(s) satisfying certain conditions:
λ(0) = 0, λ
′
(0) = T − (continuous differentiable) (7a)
s1 > s2 ≥ 0⇒ λ(s1) > λ(s2) − (strictly increasing) (7b)
lim
s→∞ λ(s) = T, lims→∞λ
′
(s) = 0 − (convergence in s) (7c)
so that for ψ(s) , ξ(t), we obtain
ψ
′
(s) = λ
′
(s)f(λ(s), ψ(s)), ψ(λ−1(0)) = x0, (8)
where ψ
′
(s) = dψ(s)/ds, λ
′
(s) = dλ(s)/ds and lims→∞ ψ(s) =
limt→T ξ(t) for any t ∈ [0, T ), s ∈ [0,∞).
In this work, the objective is to propose a prescribed-time NE
seeking algorithm so that all players’ estimates reach a consensus
and converge to the NE in a time T , and afterwards, this NE can
be maintained for t ≥ T . To achieve this goal, we can choose the
following time transformation function satisfying (7)
t = λ(s) , T (1− e−s), (9)
which implies that when s→∞, t approaches T as shown in Fig.
1, and λ(s) is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing,
which satisfies (7a)-(7b). Further, it can be verified that λ
′
(s) =
Te−s satisfies (7c). According to (9), the original time interval
t ∈ [0, T ) can thus be transformed into a new infinite-time interval
s ∈ [0,∞). Consequently, the associated stability analysis will be
transformed to focus on this new time variable s ∈ [0,∞).
4(a) λ(s) (b) λ
′
(s)
Fig. 1. The illustration of the time transformation function λ(s) and λ
′
(s).
Prescribed-time distributed NE seeking design: in light of (5),
we present a new prescribed-time distributed NE seeking strategy
so that the estimates of all players can not only reach a consensus,
but also converge to the NE in a prior-given and user-defined T ,
and this NE can be maintained for t ≥ T , which is described by
x˙i(t) = (c+
1
T − t
)ui(t), ui(t) = −RTi ▽iJi(x
i(t)) + ei(t),
ei(t) = −κ
∑N
j=1
aij(x
i(t)− xj(t)), i, j ∈ V , t ∈ [0, T ), (10)
where c, κ > 0 are constant gains, and for t ≥ T , x˙i(t) = cui(t).
Next, denote the following stacked vectors and matrices
x = col(x1, · · · , xN ), R = diag{R1, · · · ,RN}, (11)
e = col(e1, · · · , eN ), F(x) = col(▽1J1(x
1), · · · ,▽NJN (x
N )).
Then, combining (5), (10) and (11) gives rise to the following
closed-loop system in the sense of a compact form
x˙(t) = (c+
1
T − t
)
[
−RT F(x(t)) − κ(L⊗ In)x(t)
]
. (12)
It can be seen that the choice of (9) yields dλ(s)/ds = T − t,
which appears in (10). By exploiting the transformation function
in (9), the expression in (12) becomes that for s ∈ [0,∞),
ψ
′
(s) = λ
′
(s)(c+
1
T − λ(s)
)
[
−RT F(ψ(s)) − κ(L ⊗ In)ψ(s)
]
,
= Te−s(c+
1
T − λ(s)
)
[
−RT F(ψ(s))− κ(L ⊗ In)ψ(s)
]
= −θ(s)[RT F(ψ(s)) + κ(L ⊗ In)ψ(s)], (13)
where θ(s) = (1 + cT e−s) > 0 for any s ∈ [0,∞).
The following result shows that the equilibrium of the system
(13) occurs when all players reach a consensus at the NE.
Proposition 1: Consider the game over G. Under Assumptions
1, 3, and 4, x˜ = 1N ⊗x∗ is the NE of the noncooperative game if
F(x˜) = 0n (or ▽iJi(x˜
i) = 0ni). Further, at the NE, the estimates
of all players reach a consensus and equal to the NE x∗, i.e.,
x˜
i = x˜j = x∗. That is, all players’ action components coincide
with the optimal actions (x˜
i
i = x
∗
i ).
Proof: let x˜ be an equilibrium of the system. Then, for ψ˜ = x˜,
if follows from (13) that 0Nn = −RT F(ψ˜) − κ(L ⊗ In)ψ˜ as
θ(s) > 0, which implies that multiplying 1TN ⊗ In yields
0n = −(1
T
N ⊗ In)R
T F(ψ˜)− κ(1TN ⊗ In)(L ⊗ In)ψ˜. (14)
Since 1TNL = 0
T
Nn under Assumption 1, we obtain 0n = (1
T
N⊗
In)RTF(ψ˜). Then, it follows from the notations of R and F in
(11) that F(ψ˜) = 0n. Then, submitting it into (14) gives rise to
(L ⊗ In)ψ˜ = 0Nn. Hence, there exists certain θ ∈ Rn such that
ψ˜ = 1N ⊗ θ under Assumption 1. Then, it has F(1N ⊗ θ) = 0n
for each player i ∈ V . Thus, ▽iJi(θi, θ−i) = 0ni . That is, θ is a
unique NE of the game and θ = x∗. Thus, x˜ = 1N ⊗ x∗ and for
i, j ∈ V , we have x˜i = x˜j = x∗ (NE of the game).
Next, we present the main result on the distributed NE seeking
of the noncooperative game in a prescribed time.
Theorem 1: Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3 and 4 hold. Then,
given a graph G and any initial xi(0), the proposed prescribed-
time distributed NE seeking algorithm in (10) guarantees that the
estimates of all players converges to the NE in the user-defined
time T , i.e., limt→T x(t) = x˜ = 1N ⊗ x∗, provided that
κ > (ι2/ε+ ι)/λ2(L), ∀ι, ε > 0. (15)
Proof: we first make a coordinate transformation as
−→
ψ (s) = (1N ⊗ S)ψ(s) ∈ R
Nn, S =
1
N
(1TN ⊗ In), (16)
←−
ψ (s) = (T ⊗ In)ψ(s) ∈ R
Nn, T = IN −
1
N
(1N1
T
N). (17)
Then, it follows from (16) that the average estimate of ψi(s)
is described by ψ¯(s) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 ψ
i(s) = 1
N
(1TN ⊗ In)ψ(s) =
Sψ(s). For any ψ(s) ∈ RNn, it can be decomposed as ψ(s) =
−→
ψ (s)+
←−
ψ (s) with (
−→
ψ (s))T
←−
ψ (s) = 0 and (L⊗ In)
−→
ψ (s) = 0Nn
using the strongly connected condition in Assumption 1.
For stability analysis, we select the Lyapunov function as
V (ψ(s)) =
1
2
(ψ(s) − ψ˜)T (ψ(s)− ψ˜)
=
1
2
(
−→
ψ (s) +
←−
ψ (s)− ψ˜)T (
−→
ψ (s) +
←−
ψ (s)− ψ˜)
=
1
2
[ −→
ψ (s)− ψ˜
←−
ψ (s)
]T [ −→
ψ (s)− ψ˜
←−
ψ (s)
]
, (18)
where (
−→
ψ (s))T
←−
ψ (s) = 0 and (L ⊗ In)
−→
ψ (s) = 0Nn are used.
Then, differentiating V (ψ(s)) with respect to s yields
V
′
(ψ(s)) = −θ(s)(ψ(s)− ψ˜)T [RTF(ψ(s)) + κ(L ⊗ In)ψ(s)].
Since 0Nn = −RTF(ψ˜) − κ(L ⊗ In)ψ˜, the above expression
can be further rewritten as
V
′
(ψ) = −θ(s)(ψ− ψ˜)T [RT (F(ψ)−F(ψ˜))+κ(L⊗In)(ψ− ψ˜)].
In light of ψ˜ = 1N ⊗x∗, ψ =
−→
ψ +
←−
ψ , and (L⊗ In)
−→
ψ = 0Nn
under Assumption 1, then the first term in V
′
(ψ) becomes
− (ψ − ψ˜)TRT [F(ψ)− F(ψ˜)] (19)
= −(
←−
ψ )TRT [F(ψ) − F(
−→
ψ )]− (
←−
ψ )TRT [F(
−→
ψ )− F(ψ˜)]
− (
−→
ψ − ψ˜)TRT [F(ψ)− F(
−→
ψ )]− (
−→
ψ − ψ˜)TRT [F(
−→
ψ )− F(ψ˜)].
It follows from Assumption 4 that according to the ιF -Lipschitz
continuity of F , it yields that ‖F (ψ)−F (
−→
ψ )‖ ≤ ιF ‖
←−
ψ ‖. Further,
‖F(ψ)− F(
−→
ψ )‖ ≤ ιF‖
←−
ψ ‖ for certain scalar ιF > 0. In addition,
since ‖RT ‖ = 1, F(
−→
ψ ) = F (ψ¯), and F(ψ˜) = F (x∗) = 0,
− (
←−
ψ )TRT [F(
−→
ψ )− F(ψ˜)] (20)
= −(
←−
ψ )TRT (F (ψ¯)− F (x∗)) ≤ ιFT ‖
←−
ψ ‖‖ψ¯ − x∗‖,
− (
−→
ψ − ψ˜)TRT [F(ψ)− F(
−→
ψ )] (21)
= −(ψ¯ − x∗)T (F(ψ)− F(
−→
ψ )) ≤ ιFT ‖ψ¯ − x
∗‖‖
←−
ψ ‖,
5where the fact thatR
−→
ψ = ψ¯ andRψ˜ = x∗ is used, and exploiting
the ε-strong monotonicity of F , we can further have that
− (
−→
ψ − ψ˜)TRT [F(
−→
ψ )− F(ψ˜)]
= −(ψ¯ − x∗)T (F (ψ¯)− F (x∗)) ≤ −ε‖ψ¯ − x∗‖2. (22)
In addition, the second term in (V-A) can be rewritten as
− (ψ − ψ˜)T (L ⊗ In)(ψ − ψ˜) = −(
−→
ψ +
←−
ψ )T (L ⊗ In)(
−→
ψ +
←−
ψ )
= −
←−
ψ T (L ⊗ In)
←−
ψ ≤ −λ2(L)‖
←−
ψ ‖2. (23)
Let ι = max{ιF , ιF}. Substituting (20)-(23) into (V-A) gives
V
′
≤ θ[2ι‖
←−
ψ ‖‖ψ¯ − x∗‖ − (κλ2(Lˆ)− ι)‖
←−
ψ ‖2 − ε‖ψ¯ − x∗‖2]
= −θ
[
‖ψ¯ − x∗‖
‖
←−
ψ ‖
]T [
ε −ι
−ι κλ2(L)− ι
] [
‖ψ¯ − x∗‖
‖
←−
ψ ‖
]
,
= −
θ
2
[
‖
−→
ψ − ψ˜‖
‖
←−
ψ ‖
]T
O
[
‖
−→
ψ − ψ˜‖
‖
←−
ψ ‖
]
, (24)
where the fact that ‖ψ¯−x∗‖ = 1√
N
‖
−→
ψ − ψ˜‖ is used, θ > 0, and
O = 2
[
ε
N
− ι√
N
− ι√
N
κλ2(L)− ι
]
> 0 if κ > 1
λ2(L) (
ι2
ε
+ ι).
Since V (ψ(s)) in (18) is bounded on the interval s ∈ [0,∞)
and V
′
(ψ(s)) < 0 by (24), the closed-loop system in (13) is
globally stable for any ψ(0) when s → ∞. Hence, the estimate
states
−→
ψ (s) − ψ˜ and
←−
ψ (s) are bounded, and converge a largest
invariant set M = {
−→
ψ (s) = ψ˜ and
←−
ψ (s) = 0Nn} based on
the LaSalles invariance principle [33]. Thus, on this invariant set,
limt→∞(
−→
ψ (s)−ψ˜) = 0Nn and limt→∞
←−
ψ (s) = 0Nn. According
to the coordinate transformation
−→
ψ (s) and
←−
ψ (s) in (16)-(17), and
the fact that ψ(s) =
−→
ψ (s)+
←−−
ψ(s), we obtain limt→∞(ψ(s)−ψ˜) =
0Nn. Finally, based on the time transformation function in (9)
with the fact that t → T as s → ∞, and ψ(s) , x(t) with x(t)
being the solution to (12), we conclude that limt→T x˜ = 1⊗ x∗.
Thus, Problem 1 is solved in a prescribed-time T .
Next, we show that the NE can be maintained and the control
input signal remains zero over [T,∞). Moreover, the this control
signal remains C1 smooth and uniformly bounded over the whole
time interval [0,∞). The following theorem summaries this result.
Theorem 2: Consider the game over G. Under Assumptions
1, 3 and 4, the proposed prescribed-time distributed NE seeking
algorithm guarantees that the NE is maintained and the control
signal remains zero for t ≥ T . Further, the control signal remains
C1 smooth and uniformly bounded for any t ∈ [0,∞).
Proof: It follows from (13) that for a stacked vector ϑ(s),
dψ(s)
ds
= ϑ(s) = −θ(s)[RT F(ψ(s)) + κ(L ⊗ In)ψ(s)], (25)
dϑ(s)
ds
= −cT e−s[−RTF(ψ(s))− κ(L ⊗ In)ψ(s)]
− θ(s)[RT
∂F(ψ(s))
∂ψ(s)
+ κ(L ⊗ In)]
dψ(s)
ds
= −(1−
1
θ(s)
)ϑ(s)− θ(s)H(ψ(s))ϑ(s), (26)
where H(ψ(s)) = RT ∂F(ψ(s))
∂ψ(s) +κ(L⊗In) denotes a matrix with
∂F(ψ(s))/∂ψ(s) being a Hessian matrix, and 1
θ(s) ∈ (0, 1).
From Theorem 1, it has been proved by (24) that
V
′
(s) ≤ −λmin(O)θ(s)V (s), (27)
which implies that the error satisfies
‖ψ(s)− ψ˜‖ ≤ e−λmin(O)(s−s0)‖ψ(s0)− ψ˜‖, ∀s ≥ s0 = 0. (28)
Hence, the boundness of ϑ(s) can be derived as
‖ϑ(s)‖ = θ(s)‖RT (F(ψ(s)) − F (ψ˜)) + κ(L ⊗ In)(ψ(s)− ψ˜))‖,
≤ θ(s)[ιF‖‖ψ(s)− ψ˜‖+ k‖L‖ψ(s)− ψ˜‖]
≤ θ(s)(ιF + k‖L‖)e
−λmin(O)‖ψ(s(0))− ψ˜‖, (29)
which implies that ϑ(s) is bounded on [0,∞), i.e., ϑ(s) ∈ L∞
on [0,∞). Further, it follows from (26) that ϑ(s) is a bounded
solution to the system in (26) on [0,∞). Thus, it is concluded
that ui(t) in (3) is bounded on [0, T ). Moreover, according to (25)
and (26), we can see that both ϑ(s) and dϑ(s)/ds are continuous
with respect to ψ(s) on [0,∞). Since ψ(s) is continuous with
respect to s based on the continuity of (25), we obtain that ϑ(s)
and dϑ(s)/ds are continuous with respect to s ∈ [0,∞). Thus,
ψ(s) is C1 smooth with respect to s ∈ [0,∞). That is, ui(t) in
(3) is C1 smooth with respect to t ∈ [0, T ).
Next, we show that the NE can be maintained and the control
input signal ui(t) remains zero over [0,∞). Notice that for t ∈
[T,∞), the proposed algorithm in (3) yields
x˙(t) = c
[
−RT F(x(t)) − κ(L⊗ In)x(t)
]
, t ∈ [T,∞). (30)
Choose a similar Lyapunov function as (18) for t ∈ [T,∞).
V (x) =
1
2
(x− x˜)T (x − x˜) =
1
2
(−→x +←−x − x˜)T (−→x +←−x − x˜)
=
1
2
[ −→
x − x˜
←−
x
]T [ −→
x − x˜
←−
x
]
, t ∈ [T,∞) (31)
where
−→
x = (1N ⊗S)x ∈ RNn and
←−
x = (T ⊗ In)x ∈ RNn with
S, T being defined in (16)-(17).
Then, the time derivative of V (x) along (31) yields
V˙ (x) ≤ −c
[
‖x¯− x∗‖
‖←−x ‖
]T [
ε −ι
−ι κλ2(L) − ι
] [
‖x¯− x∗‖
‖←−x ‖
]
,
= −
c
2
[
‖−→x − x˜‖
‖←−x ‖
]T
O
[
‖−→x − x˜‖
‖←−x ‖
]
, t ∈ [T,∞) (32)
which implies that
V˙ (x) ≤ −cλmin(O)V (x) ≤ 0, t ∈ [T,∞). (33)
Since x is continuous at t = T from the continuity of system,
we obtain that V (x) is continuous at t = T , and then
V (T ) = lim
t→T−
(x − x˜)T (x− x˜) = 0. (34)
Combining (33) and (34) gives rise to
0 ≤ V (t) ≤ V (T ) = 0, t ∈ [T,∞), (35)
which implies that V (t) ≡ 0 on [T,∞). Thus, x − x˜ ≡ 0 on
[T,∞). Based on the fact that x˙i(t) = cui(t) for t ≥ T , it can
be verified that x˙
i(t) = cui(t) ≡ 0 on [T,∞). Hence, the NE is
maintained and the control input signal remains zero over [T,∞).
Further, it can be shown that the control input signal is C1 smooth
and uniformly bounded on [0,∞).
Overall, it is concluded that the NE is found in a prescribed-
time T and is maintained over [T,∞), and moreover, the control
input signal is C1 smooth and uniformly bounded on [0,∞).
6B. Prescribed-Time And Fully Distributed NE Seeking Design
In this subsection, we develop a novel NE seeking algorithm
that is fully distributed to remove the strong requirement that κ
in (15) requires the known global graph information.
Prescribed-time and fully distributed NE seeking algorithm:
instead of using the static gain κ in (10), we propose a dynamic
gain based distributed integral loop that tunes on-line the weights
on the edges of the topology. In light of (5), the prescribed-time
and fully distributed NE seeking algorithm is described by
x˙i(t) = (c+
1
T − t
)ui(t), ui(t) = −RTi ▽iJi(x
i(t)) + ei(t),
ei(t) = −
N∑
j=1
κij(t)aij(x
i(t)− xj(t)), i ∈ V , t ∈ [0, T ), (36)
κ˙ij(t) = (c+
1
T − t
)
[
γijaij(x
i(t)− xj(t))T (xi(t)− xj(t))
]
,
where κij(t) is a dynamic control gain with κij(0) = κji(0) ≥ 0,
i, j ∈ V , γij = γji > 0 is a scalar, and for t ≥ T , x˙
i(t) = cui(t),
κ˙ij(t) = cγijaij(x
i(t)− xj(t))T (xi(t)− xj(t)).
Remark 4: As can be seen that in (36), only relative estimated
information is used, and this proposed NE seeking algorithm will
be proved to not require any global information on the algebraic
connectivity of graphs, the Lipschitz and monotone constants of
pseudo-gradients and the number of players. Unlike [8]-[16], the
developed NE seeking algorithm is thus fully distributed.
Then, based on t = λ(s) , T (1−e−s) in (9), we can transform
(36) into the closed-loop system with respect to s ∈ [0,∞),
dψi(s)
ds
= −θ(s)[RTi ▽iJi(ψ
i(s)) +
N∑
j=1
φij(s)aij(ψ
i(s)− ψj(s))],
dφij(s)
ds
= θ(s)γijaij(ψ
i(s)− ψj(s))T (ψi(s)− ψj(s)), (37)
where θ(s) > 0, and ψi(s), φi(s) are the transformation functions
with respect to xi(t), κij(t) in (36), respectively.
Next, we present the result on the fully distributed NE seeking
of the noncooperative game in a prescribed time.
Theorem 3: Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3 and 4 hold. Then,
given a graph G and any initial xi(0), the proposed prescribed-
time and fully distributed algorithm in (36) ensures that
1) the estimates of all players converges to the NE in the user-
defined time T , i.e., limt→T x(t) = x˜ = 1N ⊗ x∗;
2) the dynamic gain κij(t) for ∀ i, j ∈ V is monotonically
increasing and converges to certain finite constants.
Proof: we choose the following Lyapunov function candidate
W (s) = V (ψ(s)) + U(s), (38)
where both differentiable function V (ψ(s)), U(s) are given by
V (ψ(s)) =
1
2
N∑
i=1
(ψi(s)− x∗)T (ψi(s)− x∗), (39)
U(s) =
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ni
1
4γij
(φij(s)− γ
∗)T (φij(s)− γ∗), (40)
where γ∗ > 0 is a constant parameter to be determined later.
Next, differentiatingW (s) with respect to s and exploiting (37)
give rise to the following expression
W
′
(s) = −θ(s)
N∑
i=1
(ψi(s)− x∗)TRTi [▽iJi(ψ
i(s)) − ▽iJi(x
∗)]
− θ(s)
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φij(s)aij(ψ
i(s)− x∗)T (ψi(s)− ψj(s))
+
θ(s)
2
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ni
aij(φij(s)− γ
∗)||ψi(s)− ψj(s)||2, (41)
where the fact that 0n = RTi ▽iJi(x
∗) at the NE has been used.
Notice that the last term in (41) can be expressed as
1
2
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ni
aij(φij(s)− γ
∗)||ψi(s)− ψj(s)||2
=
1
2
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ni
aij(φij(s)− γ
∗)(ψi(s)− ψj(s))T (ψi(s)− ψj(s))
=
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ni
aij(φij(s)− γ
∗)(ψi(s))T (ψi(s)− ψj(s)), (42)
where the fact that φij(s) = φji(s) for ∀s ≥ 0 under Assumption
1 has been used to obtain the last term.
Since
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 aijφij(s)(x
∗)T (ψi(s) − ψj(s)) = 0, then
combining (41)-(42) and canceling the same term give rise to the
following expression in the sense of compact from
W
′
(s) =θ(s)
N∑
i=1
(ψi(s)− x∗)TRTi [▽iJi(ψ
i(s))− ▽iJi(x
∗)]
− θ(s)γ∗
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ni
aij(ψ
i(s))T (ψi(s)− ψj(s))
=− θ(s)(ψ(s) − ψ˜)TRT [F(ψ(s)) − F(ψ˜)]
− θ(s)γ∗ψT (s)(L ⊗ In)ψ(s). (43)
Next, drop the symbol s in the following analysis for simplicity,
and then, it follows from (19)-(21) that
−(ψ − ψ˜)TRT [F(ψ)− F(ψ˜)] ≤ ι‖
←−
ψ ‖2 − ε‖ψ¯ − x∗‖2
+ 2ι‖
←−
ψ ‖‖ψ¯ − x∗‖. (44)
Further, the term −γ∗ψT (L ⊗ In)ψ can be expressed as
− γ∗ψT (L ⊗ In)ψ = −γ∗(ψ − ψ˜)T (L ⊗ In)(ψ − ψ˜)
= −γ∗(
−→
ψ +
←−
ψ )T (L ⊗ In)(
−→
ψ +
←−
ψ ) ≤ −γ∗λ2(L)‖
←−
ψ ‖2. (45)
Thus, combining (43)-(45) gives rise to
W
′
≤ θ[2ι‖
←−
ψ ‖‖ψ¯ − x∗‖ − (γ∗λ2(L) − ι)‖
←−
ψ ‖2 − ε‖ψ¯ − x∗‖2]
= −θ
[
‖ψ¯ − x∗‖
‖
←−
ψ ‖
]T [
ε −ι
−ι γ∗λ2(L)− ι
] [
‖ψ¯ − x∗‖
‖
←−
ψ ‖
]
,
= −θ
[
‖
−→
ψ − ψ˜‖
‖
←−
ψ ‖
]T
P
[
‖
−→
ψ − ψ˜‖
‖
←−
ψ ‖
]
, (46)
where P =
[
ε
N
− ι√
N
− ι√
N
γ∗λ2(L)− ι
]
> 0 if γ∗ > 1
λ2(L) (
ι2
ε
+ ι).
7Since W (ψ(s)) in (38) is bounded on the interval s ∈ [0,∞)
and W
′
(ψ(s)) < 0 by (49), the closed-loop system in (37) is
globally stable for any ψ(0) on s ∈ [0,∞). Hence, the estimate
states
−→
ψ (s)− ψ˜ and
←−
ψ (s) are bounded, and converge the largest
invariant setM = {
−→
ψ (s) = ψ˜ and
←−
ψ (s) = 0Nn}. Moreover, the
dynamic gain φij(s) is bounded and converges to certain finite
values. The rest is similar to the analysis in the proof of Theorem
1 and it is concluded to limt→T x˜ = 1⊗ x∗.
Similarly, we can show that the proposed prescribed-time and
fully distributed NE seeking algorithm ensures that the NE can be
maintained and the control input signal remains zero over [T,∞).
Moreover, this signal remains C1 smooth and uniformly bounded
on the whole time interval [0,∞). The details are similar to the
proof of Theorem 2, and thus are omitted here.
C. Prescribed-Time And Fully Distributed NE Seeking Design on
Jointly Switching Communication Topologies
In this subsection, we further extend the NE seeking algorithm
in (36) to consider jointly switching topologies.
Prescribed-time and fully distributed NE seeking design over
jointly switching graphs: in light of (36), we further propose the
following novel algorithm described by
x˙
i(t) = (c+
1
T − t
)ui(t), ui(t) = −RTi ▽iJi(x
i(t)) + ei(t),
ei(t) = −
N∑
j=1
κij(t)a
σ(t)
ij (x
i(t)− xj(t)), i ∈ V , t ∈ [0, T ), (47)
κ˙ij(t) = (c+
1
T − t
)
[
γija
σ(t)
ij (x
i(t)− xj(t))T (xi(t)− xj(t))
]
,
where a
σ(t)
ij represents the adjacency element of jointly switching
topologies Gσ(t), and for t ≥ T , x˙i(t) = cui(t), κ˙ij(t) = γija
σ(t)
ij
(xi(t)− xj(t))T (xi(t)− xj(t)).
Next, we transform (47) into the following closed-loop error
system with respect to the variable s ∈ [0,∞),
dψi(s)
ds
= θ(s)[
N∑
j=1
φij(s)a
α(s)
ij (ψ
j(s)− ψi(s))−RTi ▽iJi(ψ
i(s))],
dφij(s)
ds
= θ(s)γija
α(s)
ij (ψ
i(s)− ψj(s))T (ψi(s)− ψj(s)), (48)
where θ(s) > 0, and ψi(s), φij(s), a
α(s)
ij are transformation func-
tions with respect to xi(t), κij(t), and a
σ(t)
ij in (47), respectively.
Next, we present the result on the prescribed-time and fully
distributed NE seeking over switching graphs.
Theorem 4: Suppose that Assumptions 2-4 hold. Given the
graph Gσ(t) and any initial xi(0), the proposed prescribed-time
fully distributed algorithm in (47) ensures that not only all play-
ers’ estimates converge to the NE in a time T , i.e., limt→T x(t) =
x˜ = 1N ⊗ x∗ but also the dynamic gain κij(t) is monotonically
increasing and converges to certain finite constants.
Proof: consider a same Lyapunov function candidate in (38).
Then, differentiating W (s) with respect to s yields
W
′
(s) ≤ −θ(s)γ∗(ψ(s)− ψ˜)T (Lα(s) ⊗ In)(
−→
ψ (s) +
←−
ψ (s))
+ θ(s)[2ι‖
←−
ψ (s)‖‖ψ¯ − x∗‖+ ι‖
←−
ψ (s)‖2 − ε‖ψ¯(s)− x∗‖2],
where Lα(s) is the time transformation Laplacian matrix of Lσ(t).
Based on Assumption 2, Lσ(t) is jointly connected and time-
invariant on each time interval [ti, ti+1), i = 0, 1, 2, · · · . That is,
there exists certain new time interval [si, si+1), i = 0, 1, 2, · · · so
that Lα(s) = Lσ(t) as Lσ(t) is time-invariant on each time interval
[si, si+1). Moreover, Lα(s) is jointly connected on each interval
[si, si+1). Thus, we have that for each interval s ∈ [si, si+1),
W
′
(s) ≤ −θ(s)γ∗(
−→
ψ (s) +
←−
ψ (s))T (Lα(s) ⊗ In)(
−→
ψ (s) +
←−
ψ (s))
+ θ(s)[2ι‖
←−
ψ (s)‖‖ψ¯ − x∗‖+ ι‖
←−
ψ (s)‖2 − ε‖ψ¯(s)− x∗‖2]
= −θ(s)γ∗(
←−
ψ (s))T (Lα(s) ⊗ In)
←−
ψ (s) + θ(s)ι‖
←−
ψ (s)‖2
− θ(s)ε‖ψ¯(s)− x∗‖2 + 2ι‖
←−
ψ (s)‖‖ψ¯ − x∗‖,
= −θ(s)
[
‖
−→
ψ − ψ˜‖
‖
←−
ψ ‖
]T
Q
[
‖
−→
ψ − ψ˜‖
‖
←−
ψ ‖
]
, (49)
where Q =
[
ε
N
− ι√
N
− ι√
N
γ∗λmin − ι
]
> 0 if γ∗ > 1
λmin
( ι
2
ε
+ ι),
and λmin = min
{
λ2(Lσ(t)), σ(t) ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}
}
.
Since Lσ(t) is time-invariant on each time interval [si, si+1), it
is derived that W
′
(s) is differentiable on each interval [si, si+1).
Then, by (48), ψi(s) and φij(s) are bounded for [si, si+1) and
further, θ(s) is bounded for any s ∈ (0,∞]. Thus, there exists a
scalar η > 0 so that supsi≤s≤si+1,i=0,1,··· |W
′′
(s)| ≤ η.
Then, based on Corollary 1 in [27], we have lims→∞W
′
(s) =
0. Then, the closed-loop system in (48) is globally stable for any
ψi(0) and φij(0) on s ∈ [0,∞). Thus, the estimate states
−→
ψ (s)−
ψ˜ and
←−
ψ (s) are bounded, and converge the largest invariant set
M = {
−→
ψ (s) = ψ˜ and
←−
ψ (s) = 0Nn}. Further, the gain φij(s) is
bounded and converges to certain finite values.
Further, we can show that the proposed NE seeking algorithm
guarantees that the NE can be maintained and the control input
signal remains zero over [T,∞). Further, this signal remains C1
smooth and uniformly bounded on [0,∞). The details are similar
to the proof of Theorem 2, and are omitted here.
Remark 5: Notice that in the absence of prescribed-time and
fully distributed requirements, the following corollary is obtained:
Corollary 1: Under Assumptions 1-3, the following distributed
algorithm: x˙
i = −RTi ▽iJi(x
i) + ei, ei = −κ
∑N
j=1 aij(e
i − ej)
enables all players’ estimated strategies to exponentially reach a
consensus and converge to the NE if κ > ( ι
2
ε
+ ι)/λ2(Lˆ).
This corollary can cover existing results (e.g., [8] and [10]) as
special cases. It can avoid restrictive graph coupling conditions in
[10] by adding a proportional gain κ, and remove the use of high-
gain singular perturbation that yields semi-global convergence in
[8]–[10]. Here, it does not require any initial requirements, while
certain global graph information is needed.
Remark 6: The addressed prescribed-time NE seeking is par-
tially inspired by some existing finite-/fixed/appointed-time works
on consensus and optimization (e.g., [17]–[26]). However, those
works encounter certain design limitations such as the dependence
of known initial states [17], [22], [23], [25], the control parameters
[24], [26], and unavailable settling time by homogeneity analysis
[18]. The appointed-time design in [21] heavily relies on motion-
planning-based samplings. The most related work in [20] requires
two time-varying functions. Overall, the existing works cannot be
directly applied for prescribed-time distributed NE games.
8V. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
In this section, numerical examples are presented to verify the
effectiveness of the proposed NE seeking designs.
Example 1: (Energy Consumption Game)
In this example, we consider an energy consumption game of
N players for Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC)
system (see [8]), where the cost function of each player i can be
modeled by the following function:
Ji(xi, x−i) = ai(xi − bi)2 +

c N∑
j=1
xj + d

xi, i ∈ V ,
where ai > 0, c > 0, bi and d are constants for i ∈ V . It can
be verified that Assumptions 3 and 4 are satisfied. Throughout
this simulation, let ai = 1, c = 0.1, d = 10 for each player. In
the following simulation, we investigate the effectiveness of the
proposed distributed NE seeking algorithms.
Fig. 2. The communication network for a group of five players in the game: (a)
fixed graph G; (b) Laplacian matrix L.
A. Prescribed-Time Distributed NE Seeking
We consider five players (N = 5) in this energy consumption
game over an undirected and connected graph as shown in Fig.
2. Constants bi for i = 1, · · · , 5, are set to 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30,
respectively. By certain calculation based on those parameters, the
NE is x∗ = col(2.0147, 6.7766, 11.5385, 16.3004, 21.0623) [8].
The initial states are given by xii(0) = col(−2,−4,−6,−8,−10)
and xij(0) = col(15, 10, 5, 0), ∀i 6= j, which are not close to x
∗.
The control gain of the prescribed-time distributed NE seeking
algorithm in (10) is set as κ = 2 and c = 20.
Next, we perform the proposed NE seeking algorithm in (10),
and simulation results are shown in Fig. 3. In particular, Fig. 3(a)
illustrates all players’ estimate strategies on the NE x∗, while the
relative errors of all players’ actions ‖x− x∗‖/‖x∗‖ are depicted
in Fig. 3(b). As observed, all players’ estimated strategies reach
a consensus and converge to the NE within T = 1.2sec, and this
NE has been maintained for t ≥ 1.2sec.
In order to better demonstrate the prescribed-time convergence,
a comparison with the following distributed NE seeking algorithm
in Corollary 1 and the algorithm in [10] with κ = 1 is provided.
The simulated results are shown in Figs. 4, and the performance
comparison is summarized in Table. I. It can be seen that the
proposed NE algorithm illustrates the better property as expected.
TABLE I
THE PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT ALGORITHMS.
Algorithms
Parameters
κ c T (sec)
The algorithm in [10] 1 0 21
The algorithm in Corollary 1 10 0 13
The proposed algorithm in 3 2 20 1.2
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Fig. 3. Simulated results of the proposed prescribed-time NE seeking algorithm
in (10): (a) all players’ estimated strategies xi
j
(t), i, j ∈ V ; and (b) relative errors.
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Fig. 4. Simulated results of the algorithms in Corollary1 and [10], respectively.
B. Prescribed-Time And Fully Distributed NE Seeking
In this part, the proposed prescribed-time and fully distributed
algorithm in 5 is performed with the same simulation setting in
the subsection V-A. The initial states for the dynamic parameter
are set as κij(0) = 0.5. The simulation results are shown in Figs.
5-6, where the plots of all players’ strategies and relative errors
are shown in Fig. 5 and the trajectories of the dynamic gain are
depicted in Fig. 6, which converge to certain constants. It follows
from figures that players’ actions reach a consensus and converge
to the NE in a prescribed-time and fully distributed manner.
C. Prescribed-Time And Fully Distributed NE Seeking over
Jointly Switching Topologies
In this simulation, the proposed algorithm over jointly switch-
ing network topology Gσ(t) will be conducted. Specifically, we
consider the topologies dictated by the following switching signal:
σ(t) =


1, if sΓ ≤ t < (s+ 0.25)Γ ;
2, if (s+ 0.25)Γ ≤ t < (s+ 0.5)Γ ;
3, if (s+ 0.5)Γ ≤ t < (s+ 0.75)Γ ;
4, if (s+ 0.75)Γ ≤ t < (s+ 1)Γ,
(50)
where Γ = 0.4sec., and s = 0, 1, 2, · · · . The signal σ(t) defines
fixed graphs Gi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 as shown in Fig. 7. As can be seen,
Assumption 2 is satisfied even though Gi is disconnected at t ≥ 0.
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Fig. 5. Simulated results of the proposed algorithm in (36) : (a) all players’
estimated strategies xi
j
(t), i, j ∈ V ; and (b) relative errors of all players’ actions.
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Fig. 6. The plot of all players’ dynamic gain κij(t), i, j ∈ V generated by (36).
Next, we perform the proposed algorithm in the form of (47) to
accommodate switching graphs with the same simulation setting
in the subsection V-B. The simulation results are shown in Figs.
8-9. It can be seen that all players’ actions can reach a consensus
and converge to the NE in a prescribed-time and fully distributed
manner over jointly switching graphs.
Fig. 7. The jointly switching topologies Gi with P = 1, 2, 3, 4.
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Fig. 8. Simulated results of the proposed algorithm in (47): (a) all players’
estimated strategies xi
j
(t), i, j ∈ V ; and (b) relative errors of all players’ actions.
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Fig. 9. The plot of all players’ dynamic gain κij(t), i, j ∈ V generated by (47).
Example 2: (General Non-Quadratic Game)
In this example, we investigate a more general non-quadratic
noncooperative game, in which the objective functions for each
player i are described by
J1(x1, x−1) =
x21
2
+ x1
5∑
j=2
xj , J2(x2, x−2) =
e
x2
2
2
+ x2x4,
J3(x3, x−3) =
x23
2
+ x31, J4(x4, x−4) = ln(e
x4) + x24 + x
3
3,
J5(x5, x−5) = x25 − 5x5 + x
3
1x2 + x3x
4
4, i = 1, · · · , 5. (51)
Based on calculations, the NE is x∗ = col(−4.6589, 4.1589, 0,
−2, 2.5). The switching communication topologies are depicted in
Fig. 7. Without loss of generality, we only perform the proposed
prescribed-time and fully distributed NE algorithm in (47) for this
non-quadratic game. The same simulation settings as those in the
subsection V-C are considered.
The simulation result is depicted in Fig. 10, where all players’
strategies and relative errors are provided in Fig. 10 (a) and Fig.
10 (b), respectively. As we can see, under the proposed algorithm,
all players’ estimates reach a consensus and converge to the NE
of this non-quadratic noncooperative game in the prescribed-time
and fully distributed manner over switching graphs.
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Fig. 10. Simulated results of the proposed algorithm in (47): (a) all players’
estimated strategies xi
j
(t), i, j ∈ V ; and (b) relative errors of all players’ actions.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, prescribed-time fully distributed algorithms have
been presented for NE seeking of non-cooperative games, where
players’ strategies are updated through a communication graph.
The significant feature of proposed algorithms is that the global
convergence of the NE is achieved in a prescribed-time and fully
distributed manner. That is, the convergence time is user-defined
according to task requirements and it is independent of any initial
conditions and design parameters. Moreover, the proposed fully
distributed algorithm does not require any global information on
the algebraic connectivity of graphs, the Lipschitz and monotone
constants of pseudo-gradients, and the number of players. Lastly,
we have extended this algorithm to accommodate jointly switch-
ing graphs. The effectiveness of the developed approach has been
illustrated by the numerical examples. Further work may consider
distributed NE seeking problems for noncooperative games with
coupled equality and/or inequality constraints.
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